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I.

THE UTAH STATUTES REIMPLEMENTING THE DEATH PENALTY
DC NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN GREGG V. GEORGIA,
PROFFITT V, FLORIDA, AND JUREK V. TEXAS*
The United States Supreme Court has declared that
direct review by Appellate Courts of the appropriateness of
each death sentence case is a crucial procedure which must be
employed in any capital punishment scheme in order to satisfy
1
the requirements of Furman v. Georgia,
In these cases, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
principles first announced in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972).

As Justice Stewart stated in Gregg v. Georgia:
"Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded
a sentencing body on a matter so grave or the determination of whether a human life should be taken or
spared, that discretion must be suitably directed
and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly
arbitrary or capricious action." 96 S. Ct. at 2932.
In Gregg v. Georgia, Justice Stewart, in announcing

the judgement of the court, stated that because of the uniqueness
of the death penalty, it cannot be imposed under any sentencing
procedure that creates a substantial risk that it may be inflicted
in an arbitrary or capricious manner.

In reviewing the capital

penalty statute of the State of Georgia, the court, at several

1.

Gregg v. Georgia,
U. S.
, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida,
U. S.
, 96 S.Ct. 2960 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas,
U. S.
, 96 S.Ct. 2950 (1976);
Woodson v. North Carolina,
U. S.
, 96 S.Ct. 2978 (1976);
Roberts V. Louisiana,
U. S.
, 96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976).
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points in the opinion, emphasized the function of the special
expedited direct review of capital cases which was followed
by the Georgia Supreme Court.

A plurality of the Justices

acknowledged that these special review procedures constituted an important additional safeguard to check the possibility
2
of the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.
Under the law of Georgia, the appellate court
is required by statute to automatically review each sentence
of death and determine whether it was imposed under the influence
of passion or prejudice, whether the evidence supports the
jury's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and
whether the sentence is disproportionate compared to sentences
3
imposed in similar cases.
The Georgia Supreme Court in Coley
v. State, 231 Ga. 329, 204 S. E. 2d 612 (1974) has held that
a death sentence will be set aside on the appellate level if
excessive in light of comparative sentences imposed for
similar cases.
The Court placed great emphasis on the ability of
the Georgia Supreme Court to determine in each case whether
the death sentence is excessive or disproportional.

As Justice

Stewart stated:
"The proportionality review substantially eliminates
the possibility that a person will be sentenced to
die by the action of an aberrant jury. 96 S. Ct. 2940."

2. See the concurring opinion of Justice White, with whom the
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined.
3.

Georgia Code Ann. Section 27-2537(c) (Supp. 1975).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
In Proffit v. Florida, the death penalty statute
of Florida provides for sentencing in all cases by the trial
judge instead of a jury and required automatic review by the
5
Supreme Court of Florida of all death sentence cases. The
trial judge, not the jury, in sentencing under Florida!s
system must justify the imposition in every case of the death
sentence with written findings to the State Supreme Court,
In State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (1973) , the Florida Supreme
Court held that they had the duty on appellate review of
capital cases that went beyond the scope of review in other
criminal cases. The court stated that Supreme Court review
should guarantee that aggravating and mitigating reasons
present in one case lead to a similar result to that reached
under similar circumstances in another case and the appellate
court must determine whether or not the punishment of death
in any individual case is too great.
The United States Supreme Court in upholding the
Florida death penalty scheme under Furman placed great
emphasis on these review procedures.

The Court stated that

the conscientious review by a court with state-wide jurisdiction

4.

Supra,, Page 1.

5c

Fla. State. Ann., Sec. 921.141(4) (Supp. 1976-1977).
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would assure the consistency, fairness, and rationality that
would prevent the imposition of the death sentence in an
arbitrary or capricious manner.

The Court noted that because

the procedure developed by the Florida court, the Florida
court had in effect adopted the type of proportionality
6
review mandated in the Georgia statute at issue in Gregg.
In Texas, the conviction of death is subject to
7
automatic review by the Texas Court of Criminal Apoeals.
8
In Smith v. State,
the Court of Appeals of Texas examined
carefully the death sentence imposed in that case as to the
appropriateness of its imposition in light of the prior
history of the defendant.

In Jurek v. Texas the Supreme

Court found that the Texas appellate procedure provided
means which would promote the evenhanded, rational, and
consistent imposition of the death penalty in that state.
In Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, the United
States Supreme Court held that the death sentence as applied
in North Carolina was unconstitutional because the mandatory
death penalty system violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.

An important factor in this decision by the

court was the absence in North Carolina of the proper appellate
review process.

In North Carolina the court found that neither

6.

Proffitt v. Florida at 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976),

7.

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071 (1973).

8.

No. 49,809 (Feb. 18, 1976).
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at the trial or appellate level could the judiciary check
the arbitrary and capricious exercise of the sentencing
9
in death penalty cases.
The Utah statutes, Utah Code Annotated 76-3-206 and
76-3-207 (Supp. 1975) do not outline an appellate review process
which meets the requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Under the

scope of review employed in the State of Utah in criminal
cases, this court has no means to promote the evenhanded,
rational, and consistent imposition of the death penalty on
a statewide basis. Furthermore, the appeal procedure in
Utah is discretionary, not mandatory and automatic as in
each of the three cases before the Supreme Court.
Therefore, the sentence of the appellant imposed
under their capital punishment statutory scheme is unconstitutional and should be reversed.

9.

See also, Roberts v. Louisiana, supra, at 96 S. Ct.
300 7 re appellate review.
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II.

POINT II. THE DEATH PENALTY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT BECAUSE
IT DOES NOT SERVE A COMPELLING STATE
INTEREST WHICH COULD NOT BE FULFILLED
BY A LESS DRASTIC MEANS

The appellant hereby incorporates Point II of
original brief.
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III.

POINT III. APPELLANT'S DEATH SENTENCE WHICH
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL SHOULD BE REVERSED,
AND PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
76-3-207 (4) SHOULD BE REMANDED TO
THE TRIAL COURT FOR THE APPELLANT TO
BE SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT

The appellant hereby incorporates Point III
of original brief.
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AMENDED IV

A)

THE SENTENCE OF DEATH SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE

THE SENTENCE IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE IS DISPROPORTIONATE
AND EXCESSIVE IN RELATION TO THE OFFENSE FOR WHICH THE
DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED AND THE DEFENDANT'S INVOLVEMENT IN
THAT OFFENSE.
B)

THE APPELLANT'S SENTENCE OF DEATH SHOULD BE

REVERSED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL
JUDGES IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY.
C)

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT

TO WARRANT IMPOSITION OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER.
The appellant submits that if the court should
find that the death penalty statute in Utah is not per se
unconstitutional, the aforementioned recent decisions by
the Supreme Court require that this court exercise the type
of special, direct review of death penalty cases specified by the
Supreme Court.
As outlined in Amended Point I of this brief, a
mandatory, special, direct review of the appropriateness of
each individual death sentence is a crucial procedure that
must be employed to satisfy the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Paragraph (3) of Utah Code Annotated 76-3-207
(Supp. 1975) provides:
"Upon any appeal by the defendant where the sentence
is^of death/the supreme court, if it finds prejudicial
error in the sentencing proceeding only, may set aside
the sentence of death and remand the case to the trial
court, in which event the trial court shall impose the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
sentenceMachine-generated
of life OCR,
imprisonment."
may contain errors.

Under the above quoted section, this court has the
ability to exercise the obligation placed upon state appellate
courts by the United States Supreme Court to assure that the
death penalty in Utah is not inflicted in an arbitrary or
capricious manner.

By reviewing each case in which the penalty

of death is imposed, this court can determine whether in fact
the sentence of the individual defendant is or is not disproportional to the offense committed.

In each case the court

should review the sentence in light of the circumstances of
the crime, the aggravating and mitigating factors present,
and other sentences for similar crimes. The court by employing
"proportionality review" can substantially eliminate the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action
of an arbitrary or capricious manner.
This court also has the duty to carefully review
the entire trial and sentencing procedure of each death penalty
case and to reverse the death sentence if any prejudicial
error is found by the court in any phase of the trial. As
the United States Supreme Court stated in Gregg:
"There is no question that death as a punishment
is unique in its severity and irrevocability...
When a defendant's life is at stake, the court
has been particularly sensitive to insure that
every safeguard is observed. 96 S, Ct. at 2932.
The Utah Supreme Court has traditionally employed
a special review standard in capital cases.

State v. Riley,

41 Utah 2d 225, 126 P. 294 (1911); State v. Stenback, 78 Utah
350, 2 P. 2d 1050 (1931); State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145 P.
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2d 1003 (1944); and State v. Materi, 119 Utah 143, 225 P.
2d 325 (1950).

In these cases the court has held that it

has a duty to review the entire record that does not exist
in ordinary criminal appeals, and will raise questions of
error on its own motion.

In State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d

230, 282 P. 2d 323 (1955) this court said:
"Under such circumstances (a capital case) it is
our duty to scrutinize with care the propriety of
all aspects of the proceedings, at 332."
The court expressed this concept again in State v.
Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P. 2d 512 (1968) in another manner
in reversing one defendant's death sentence:
"... with the defendant's life at stake,
this court should not hazard a guess. The
[evidence at issue] could very well have
tipped the scales in favor of the death
penalty" at 515.
In light of the foregoing standards of review the
appellant submits:

(1) That the penalty of death in appellant's

case is disproportionate and excessive in relation to the offense
which the defendant was convicted and the defendant's involvement in the offense; (2) The evidence introduced at the trial
and hearing and sentence does not support the sentence of death
in light of the mitigating factors present in appellant's case.
In the appellant's case, the trial judge sentenced
all of the defendants to death primarily on the basis of the
fact that the crime itself was "brutal, malicious and ruthless".
Judge Sheya in announcing his decision said:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"if this is not a case warranting death, .
when you consider the facts that a man
was murdered, taken out of his bed, practically at midnight without any justification,
cause or excuse, whatsoever, and murdered in
the manner that this man was, ruthlessly and
brutally, it is hard to imagine a case that
would warrant the death penalty." (T650)
The brutality or heinousness of the crime, which so
influenced the trial judge is not an aggravating circumstance
which the Utah legislature has specified as a condition warranting the imposition of first degree murder or an aggravating
factor to be considered in sentencing.
The only statutorily enumerated aggravating factor
which was involved in this case is that the homicide was
committed while the actor was engaged in a kidnapping.

How-

ever, the evidence indicates that any kidnapping or detention
of the victim was merely incidental.

If not for the detention

and transportation of the victim before the homicide the
crime would not have been elevated to first degree murder from
second degree and the appellant would not now be facing the
death penalty.

This is not the usual case of a kidnapping

where a collateral homicide is accomplished to facilitate
the kidnapping.
On the other hand, the following evidence of
statutory mitigating factors was introduced during the trial
and hearing on sentence by the defense.
The appellant, Irvin Dunsdon, did not have any
significant history of prior criminal activity.

During the

hearing, the appellant testified that at the time of the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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incident he was employed and was working as a journeyman
painter.

(T. 580)

The appellant testified that his only

previous criminal conviction was for a misdemeanor of
being an accessory after the fact of theft in Indiana.
(T. 599)

The State offered no evidence of any other previous

criminal activity by the appellant and thus this mitigating
factor stands unrebutted.
The trial court did not have before it the
accurate sentencing information which the Supreme Court
in Gregg v. Georgia said was an indispensable prerequisite
to a reasoned determination of whether the defendant should
live or die.

96 S. Ct. at 2933.

If the appellant had com-

mitted a felony on the Third Degree the court would have
had substantially more information through the pre-sentence
report procedure normally available to the court.
At the time of the murder, the capacity of the
appellant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirement of law was
substantially impaired as the result of intoxication by
both alcohol and drugs.

The evidence showed that the apel-

lant prior to the party which they attended on April 8, 19 75,
had smoked three
(T. 582)

!f

joints" of marijuana with his girlfriend.

At the party he testified that he had consumed

about 10 cups of beer during the course of the evening.
(T. 582)

Also, he had taken four of the "Valium" pills

at the party.

(T. 582)

The appellant stated on cross-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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examination that "we was both pretty high...We was
stumbling and staggering all night during the whole thing'1.
(T. 593)

He also testified chac he had trouble driving

the truck.

The fact that there was

a great quantity of

both drugs and alcohol at the party on the evening of April 8
and that the appellant was drinking and taking pills was
corroborated by the testimony of several witnesses.

(T. 492f

T. 493, T. 508). Furthermore, an expert called by the defense
testified that the effect of the drugs taken and alcohol consumed (was) would be exaggerated because
(T. 544)

they were combined.

He testified that the combination of beer and

"valium" usually results in abnormally aggressive behavior
and a distortion of judgment.

(T. 545)

The only evidence offered by the prosecution to
negate this evidence was the testimony of several of the
police officers who were present when the defendants were
subsequently arrested on the morning of April 9, after the
affects of the drugs and alcohol had dissipated.
The evidence clearly shows that the appellant's
actions on the morning of April 9 were substantially impaired
as the direct result of his intoxicated state.

Section 76-3-208

(1) (d) of the capital punishment provisions is unique in its
consideration for voluntary intoxication in the Utah Criminal
Code.

The general rule as stated in Utah Code Annotated 76-2-306

(Supp. 1975) is that voluntary intoxication is not a defense
unless it negates the existence of the necessary mental state.
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Utah does not mitigate first or second degree homicide on
the basis of "diminished capacity" resulting from intoxication.
C. F. Utah Code Annotated 76-5-205 (Supp. 1975).

The unique-

ness of Section 76-3-208(1) (d) indicates a legislative intent
that the severity of the penalty of death should be mitigated
by the fact of substantial intoxication in sentencing even
when voluntary intoxication would not be available to mitigate
the finding of guilt.
The appellant was an accomplice in the murder
committed by the defendant, Marvel, and his participation
was relatively minor.

The appellant never intended to

kill the victim when he went to his home.

(T. 5 90)

He

admitted when he was on the stand that he had intended
to "maybe punch him around a bit", when they went to
Hogan's house.

(t.

587)

He testified that on the evening

of April 8 he struck the victim and he had "fell" to the
ground.

(T. 588)

The appellant testified that as the

victim was running down the driveway, Craig Marvel shot
the defendant.

(T. 588)

This was the first time he

realized that something other than a fist fight was taking
place.

(T. 590)

The testimony of the other defendants cor-

robate the fact that there was no planning or premeditation
of the shooting that evening.

After the shot was fired, the

appellant testified that he was "paranoid and scared" and
thought the victim was dead.

(T. 588)

While the shots were

being fired in the canyon by Marvel, the appellant v/as turning
the truck around in the snow.

(T. 595)
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The evidence shows that the appellant was unwittingly involved in an incident which he had not anticipated
or planned.

Furthermore, the degree of his involvement as

an accomplice should be viewed in light of his intoxicated
condition.
The appellant submits that the trial court
committed prejudicial error in finding the appellant guilty
of First Degree Murder and in sentencing the appellant to
death.

Furthermore, the appellant submits that his is not

a case for the imposition of the death penalty.
Therefore, the court should reverse the judgement
of the lower court and either remand the case for retrial
or set aside the death penalty.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT VAN SCIVER

RANDALL T. GAITHER
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